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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NORTHCREST, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.\V ALI(ER BANI~ & TRUST C01Ip ANY, a corporation, ·as executor
of the last will and testament and
estate of LUCIE R. THOMAS, who
was sometimes known as L. R.
THO:NIAS, deceased; JOHN LIVINGSTON THOMAS and ADELAIDE R. TH01IAS, his wife;
and GERTRUDE THOMAS
GARDNER,
Defendants and Respondents,

Case No.
7735

HUGH L. THOMAS, JR, unmarried; WALTER WRIGHT; and
H. C. BROWNLEE, Trustee,
Defendants.

Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Quiet title action by N orthcrest, Inc., a Salt Lake
real estate company.
The lands are two adjoining tracts, roughly 40 acres
each, located on the North Bench of Salt Lake City.
(Title to some, but not all, of a number of platted lots in
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NORTHCREST, INC. VS.

the Southwest corner of the West 40 acre tract was
stipulated and adjudged in Northcrest. The other lots,
however, were litigated and were adjudicated the same
as the main tracts. See map Exhibit A.)
Principal defendants were a brother and sister, John
Livingston Thomas (and wife), who lives in New York
City, and Gertrude Thomas Gardner, who lives in the
Virgin Islands. (Tr. 4). A defendant also was their
unmarried younger brother, Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., Salt
Lake City. He had received $3,200.00 from Northcrest
for a deed to the lands. (Tr. 78). Also defendant was
Walker Bank and Trust Company, their mother's executor. She was Lucie R. (L. R.) Thomas. She was the
former owner. All parties who claim title claim through
her as the common source.
As stated, Hugh, Jr., the younger brother, received
$3,200.00 from N orthcrest for a warranty deed from
himself to that company. That deed was dated June 11,
1948. (Exhibit C). He had held an earlier deed from his
mother, Lucie, to him dated and recorded the year before,
September 16 and December 11, 1947. (Exhibit B).
Hugh's brother and sister learned he had sold. They
were wroth. They claimed the mother's deed to him was
spurious (not being in her own signature). They claimed
she had not conveyed but had died owning title and that
Hugh's deed-after their mother's death-therefore conveyed only his one-third share as her devisee-no more.
(John, Gertrude and Hugh, Jr. were her only children
and sole heirs and devisees in equal shares.)
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Beleaguered by kin and purchaser both, young Hugh
wanted no part of this suit. So he defaulted. (Two
others, formal parties only-not important here-did
not defend, defendants \V right and Brownlee.)
The trial proceeded. X orthcrest was opposed by
John, Gertrude and their mother's executor.
But, by then Northcrest did not rest on Hugh's title
alone. By then it had become able to trace title back to
the mother in two other ways besides: (1) through an
early recorded deed by her to Utah Savings & Trust Company and a recent one in turn from Utah Savings to itself, and, also, (2) through an old recorded deed to about
half of the property (most of the West 40 acre tract)
from mother Lucie to H. H. Hempstead and a deed from
Hempstead's widow and decree against Hempstead's
administrator to that half as well. (Manifestly, Northcrest in proving title could not be limited to evidence
of ownership through one specific chain alone. A party
may prove ownership by any means he can; and by as
many alternate titles as he has. That postulate is, of
course, implicit in the law. One alleging title in general
terms-not by a specific chain-may prove "whatever
title he has". State vs. Rolio, 71 Utah 91, 262 P. 987.)
But, the court fell into error as the trial progressed.
It let Utah Savings & Trust Company give evidence that
its old 1914 records would seem to indicate that they had
held a warranty deed from Lucie only as security for a
loan now repaid. Too, it heard evidence from the lips
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of a notary public herself impeaching her solemn, official,
recorded certificate thereon to the contrary, that Lucie
had not in fact acknowledged the deed which bore her
name and ran to her son, Hugh, the younger brother
who had afterward sold to N orthcrest. And, it refused
to honor, but entirely disregarded, even plaintiff's title
to theW est half of the property which ran from Lucie-toHempstead-to-Northcrest. In fact, the court refused to
find upon the effect of the Hempstead title at all, its findings only reciting some of the evidence relating thereto.
And when the trial ended, the court decided (1) that
the deed from Lucie to son, Hugh, was invalid, (2) that
her warranty deed to Utah Savings & Trust Company
was only a mortgage, not a deed absolute, ( 3) that Lucie
had not conveyed to anyone at all but died owning the
property (what about Hempstead's West 40 acres?), (4)
that sons Hugh and John, and daughter, Gertrude, each
took a third on their mother's death as her devisees,
and, (5) Northcrest could have title only to Hugh's V3
by his deed to them.
The court then adjudicated the title accordingly:
Northcrest ¥3, John ¥3, and Gertrude Y3, subject however, to probate of Lucie's estate and possession by her
executor. (Tr. 113). This was error, as we shall see.
The court should have awarded the entire fee to Northcrest, not just VJ. The judment, therefore, must be
reversed.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
Northcrest's Title Through Utah Savings And Trust
Company.
1. The Evidence Failed To Establish The Deed From

Hugh's ~!other (~\nd Father) To Utah Savings And
Trust Company Was Intended As A Mortgage.
2. The Evidence Was Wholly Insufficient To Establish
The Bank's Deed As A Mortgage.
3. The Evidence By Utah Savings And Trust Company
Attempting To Prove The Deed A Mortgage Was
Incompetent After It Had Conveyed To N orthcrest.
Northcrest's Title Through Hugh L. Thomas, Jr.
1. The Notary's Testimony Denying Lucie Acknow-

ledged The Deed To Hugh, Jr. Was Incompetent.
2. Since the N" otary 's Evidence That Lucie Did Not
Acknowledge The Deed To Hugh, Jr. Was Incompetent And Insufficient, The Acknowledgment Stands.
The Deed (Exhibit B) Survives.
Northcrest's Title Through Hempsteads.
1. N orthcrest Established Title To The West Forty

Acre Tract Through H. H. Hempstead, Regardless
Of Its Alternate Titles To Both Tracts.
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ARGUMENT
NORTHCREST'S TIT'LE THROUGH UTAH SAVINGS
AND TRUST COMPANY
1. The Evidence Failed To Establish The Deed From Hugh's

Mother (And Father) To Utah Savings & Trust Company Was Intended As A Mortgage.

On this proposition, all else aside, we should be willing to rest appellant's case.
That a deed absolute on its face may be shown to
be intended only as a mortgage, we cannot deny. It is
too late. The rule is universal. Utah agrees. Coray vs.
Roberts 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 2d 940. Thornley L. L. Company vs. Gailey 105 Utah 519, 143 P. 2d 283. Gibbons vs.
Gibbons 103 Utah 266,135 P. 2d 105.
The only question in every case is what did the
parties intend; what was their intention.
''Whether a deed absolute in form is to be
taken as a mortgage depends on the intention of
the parties at the time of its execution." 59 C. J. S.
:Mortgages~ 36.
The mutual intention of the parties must be proved.
36 Am. Jur., Mortgages~ 132. This implies, both parties,
grantor and grantee, must intend the deed to be a
mortgage.
''In order to convert a deed absolute in its
terms into a mortgage it is necessary that the
understanding and intention of both parties,
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grantee as well as grantor, to that effect be concurrent and the same.'' (Italics added) Id.

Obviously, therefore,
''A mere secret intention on the part of one
of the parties, not disclosed or communicated to
the other, will not have the effect of changing the
character of the transaction. Still less will this
result where the parties have directly contradictory intentions.'' Id.
The evidence here was fatally deficient. That of the
grantee aside, the intention of the grantors was never
shown; there was no evidence at all upon the subject of
the grantors' intention; absolutely none.
Northcrest claimed through Utah Savings and Trust
Company. It proved a recorded deed to both 40 acre
tracts (less the small area containing the platted lots)
from Lucie R. Thomas and husband to Utah Savings &
Trust Company in 1914. (Exhibit D). It was a warranty
deed. It said so. And it contained full covenants of warranty. It was upon its face a conveyance absolute. And,
Utah Savings later conveyed to Northcrest in 1947.
(Exhibit E). This deed to Northcrest was not disputed.
It was received without objection. (Tr. 24.)
The respondents claimed Utah Savings had no title
to convey to N orthcrest. They tried to prove the deed to
Utah Savings was really only a mortgage; ergo, Utah
Savings had nothing to convey to Northcrest and, consequently, N orthcrest got nothing by that chain. And so
they called an officer of Utah Savings. E. R. McGee,
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Assistant Cashier. They questioned him (in 1951) about
the deed to Utah Savings (in 1914) before he even worked
at the bank. Obviously he knew nothing of the transaction; he said so. (Tr. 66). But, obviously, too, he was
called to try and prove nevertheless that the 1914 deed to
the bank (Exhibit D) had been intended only as a mortgage. Remember, the intention of both parties, not just
one, must be shown to prove a deed a mortgage. McGee's
inability to prove that is self evident. To his credit, however, it must be said he did his best. But it wasn't enough.
It just could not be proved. He did not testify to anything about the grantor's intention at all. He couldn't.
He produced some records of the bank. But they said
nothing about the subject. It just wasn't there. (We claim
he proved nothing about the intention of the grantee
either in respect to this particular deed. The bank's
record did not refer to any deed in particular. See Page
21 infra.)
McGee testified that the bank's old records showed a
loan to the grantors, renewed twice afterward; that the
bank's cards on the two renewals (white cards 6447 and
7178 of Exhibit 8) indicated the bank had held a warranty deed for security to ''part'' of Section 29 (but what
part?) ; and that the loan and renewals had been paid.
Of course, no deed from Utah Savings back to the grantors was proved. Respondents lament that fact.
If the deed before us (Exhibit D) could be assumed
as the one referred to in the bank's card (and we submit
it cannot, the possibility of an unrecorded one having
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been given and handed back on payment of the loan must
not be overlooked) what about intention of both parties,
grantor and grantee thereto1 So that the court may have
easy access to McGee's evidence, we reproduce it here in
full. Note the entire lack of any evidence upon the intention of the grantors; not to mention the utter failure to
identify the deed claimed to have been deposited as
security. (Tr. 62.)
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. CHRISTENSEN:
Q.

State your name, please.

A.

E. R. McGee.

Q.

What is your occupation, Mr. McGee?

A.

Assistant cashier, Utah Savings & Trust Company.

Q.

What are your duties as such 1

A.

Oh, handling personnel, making some loans, little
auditing, and so forth.

Q. Do you have access to the records of the Utah Savings & Trust Company?

A. Ido.
Q.

I show you three cards, held together by an elastic
band, which are marked as "Exhibit 8", and ask you
if you know what those cards are.
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A.

These cards are loan liability records.

Q.

Of

A.

Of Hugh L. and Lucie R. Thomas.

Q.

With

A.

With the Utah Savings & Trust Company.

Q.

Did you withdraw them from the records of that
Company?

A.

I did.

Q.

Are those records of the Utah Savings & Trust
company?

A.

That is correct.

Q.

Now, the first card on which the exhibit markings
are made, is a blue card; and in the right hand
column is the date, "Nov. 13 13." What does that
indicate¥

A.

That indicates that this loan was made on November
13,1913.

Q.

And opposite those figures is the figure "900".
What does that indicate?

A.

That would indicate the amount of the loan, 90 day
note.

what~

whom~
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Q.

Then immediately below the first date, it shows
"10 14" I belieYe-no, it is a ditto mark-

A.

1-10-14.

Q.

1-10-1-!. What does that indicate u?

A.

That would indicate on January 10, 1914 three hundred dollars was paid on this nine hundred dollar
loan, leaving a balance of six hundred dollars.

Q.

Mr. :McGee, does the record indicate whether or not
the loan was secured at that time~

A.

This record here does not indicate that the loan was
secured at that time.

Q.

If you will take the next card in order, please. What
does that indicate~

A.

Well, this next card is dated January 12, 1914 and
it is a renewal of this six hundred dollar balance on
this first blue card ; but it was increased from $600.00
to $1,400.00.

Q.

Then there is a subsequent date, October 15, 1914,
and opposite that the figure "500". What does that
indicate~

A.

That would indicate a payment on the principal of
$500.00, reducing the loan to $900.00.

Q.

Then "10-20-14", opposite that "900". What does
that indicate?
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A.

Well, that indicates that the loan was due at that
time, and renewed for the same amount, for $900.00.

Q.

Referring to this second card, January 12, 1914, does
it indicate any security~

A.

Apparently, in our security column on this liability
card, it has "R. E. Warranty Deed-Part of Sec. 29
Tp. 1 No. Range 1 E, S. L. Mer."
~IR.

THOMAS: At that point. I didn't anticipate
that coming as quick as it did. I move to strike out
the witness' answer in regard to the alleged security
and description, and object to the same upon the
ground it is incompetent, immaterial, irrelevant,
and as constituting an attempt on the part of the
Utah Savings & Trust Company, the grantor of this
plaintiff, to furnish statements and declarations
against its ownership, and against the title of the
plaintiff after the Utah Savings & Trust Company
has parted with title.
THE COURT: They did so by Quit Claim Deed.
That is in evidence.
MR. THOMAS: That is right. Exhibit E.
(Argument by counsel.)
THE COURT: I am going to let you proceed. Objection overruled.
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Will you give me the last
question and answer.
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(Reporter read record.)
MR. THO~IAS: Will you read the
(Reporter read record.)

objection~

MR. THOMAS: I would like to add to that, if I may;
it is also hearsay and not binding on the plaintiff.
THE COURT: Objection overruled.
Q.

(By ~Ir. Christensen) With respect to the third card,
Mr. l\1cGee, the date of that is what~

A.

Octo her 12, 1914.

Q.

And you say that was a

A.

It indicates a renewal of this other card, referring to
the particular note number, for $900.00.

Q.

Then the next line shows the date of 7-17-15; opposite
that the :figure "450". What does that indicate~

A.

That would indicate a payment on the principal on
that date.

Q.

Then there is a subsequent entry of 11-3-15, an.d also
opposite that "450". What does that indicate~

A.

That would indicate that was $450.00, the balance on
the loan at that time, and it was paid off.

Q.

So it indicates payment in full of the note; is that
correct?

renewal~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

NORTHCREST, INC. VS.

A.

That is correct.

Q.

Was there any interest in connection with this loan?

A.

Yes. It has 10 per cent on the first card. It was increased to 12 per cent rate. And the last card was
10 per cent rate.

Q.

Is there any place on the cards indicating payment
of interest 1

A.

Yes. Each card indicates payment of interest on the
back of the card, for various amounts, various
payments.

Q.

The entries on the reverse side indicate the payments
of interest 1

A.

Payments of interest on that particular loan.
MR. CHRISTENSEN: We offer in evidence Defendants' Exhibit 8.
You may cross examine.
MR. THOMAS: Are these three all one exhibit,
Mr. Christensen 7
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes.
CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. THOMAS:
Q.

Were you employed by the bank on the date of these
documents, Exhibit 8, in 1914 and 1915!
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A.

No, I wasn't.

Q.

You don't know anything a bout the transactions
which they purport to represent, do you~

A.

No, not those transactions.

nlR. TH011AS: I object to them, your Honor, as
incompetent, immaterial, irrelevant and hearsay,
and upon the grounds that the proper foundation
has not been laid, and also upon the grounds they
are an attempt on the part of the Utah Savings &
Trust Company, the grantor of this plantiff to give
evidence in disparagement of its own title to the
property in question. That is, I assume they are
offered for the purpose of showing the security
transaction of the real estate involved here.
MR. CHRISTENSEN: That is right.
MR. THOMAS: I object to them on those grounds.
THE COURT: Objection overruled, and the exhibit
will be received.
MR. THOMAS: Are you

through~

MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes.
MR. THOMAS: That is all.
(Witness excused.)
McGee's testimony said nothing upon the subject of
what the gra;ntors' intention was. And it was inadequate
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in another and no less fatal respect besides: It did not
identify the deed here (Exhibit D) as being the deed deposited for security. This suggested itself to counsel
later, for after the trial had been recessed for several
weeks and then renewed, respondent proved the deed
in question (Exhibit D) was the only deed recorded in the
Salt Lake County Recorder's office from Lucie R.
Thomas and husband to Utah Savings. We objected. The
court remarked that he could not see that the proof
was material, but received it anyway. (Tr. 102).
It must clearly appear that a deed absolute was intended as a mortgage to make it such. And both parties
must so intend.
"It must appear to the court beyond all reasonable controversy that it was the intention of
not only one, but all, of the parties, that the deed
should be a mortgage,' 'W ehle vs. Price, 202 Cal.
394, 260 P. 878.

Mutual intention is to be determined.
''. . . The primary inquiry relates to the
intention of the parties at the time the transaction
was consummated. Mutual intent is to be determined ... " (Italics added) Umpqua Forest Industries vs. Neenah-Oregon Land Co., 188 Ore. 605,
217 P. 2d 219.
A deed absolute is presumed what it appears to be;
both parties must intend otherwise to make it a mortgage.
" ... the presumption of law is that the transfer is what it appears to be and that he who would
assert that it was given as a mortgage must so
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show by clear and convincing evidence; and that
the intent must be that of both parties and not
merely of one party." Hoffman 1'S. Graaf, 179
Wash. 431, 38 P. 2d 236.
There was no proof that the warranty deed referred
to on the bank's records was the one (Exhibit D) produced. But, if we were to assume that it was, McGee's
testimony at its best can only be treated as evidence of
the bank's (grantee's) intention to regard it as a mortgage. But that is not enough. Respondents here are in
the predicament of the respondent who was reversed in
Davis vs. Stewart, 4 Cal. App. 604, 88 P. 2d 734:
"The respondent shows no more than that
one of those who engaged in the transaction had
the undisclosed intention to treat it differently.
The rule is thus stated in 41 Cor. Jur., page 332:
'But in order to convert a deed absolute in its
terms into a mortgage it is necessary that the
understanding and intention of both parties,
grantee as well as grantor, to that effect be concurrent and the same '. ''
Always, the evidence that a deed is a mortgage must
be "clear", "unequivocal" and "satisfactory." Coray
vs. Roberts 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 2d 940.
Thus to convert a deed into a mortgage the evidence
(1) must show both parties so intended, and, (2) must be
clear, unequivocal and satisfactory that they did. Here it
was fatally wanting in both respects. There was no evidence upon the subject of the grantors' intention; none
whatever. But the court strained its findings to say both
parties intended the deed to be a mortgage, declaring it
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"was not intended by either the grantor or the grantee"
as a deed absolute. (Tr. 110). But that was not the evidence; at least, not as to the grantors. There was no evidence that they intended any mortgage. Their deed is
the only evidence of their intention. It said they conveyed, absolute. The court erred in finding contrary to their
expressed intention that the deed was absolute. There
is just no evidence to sustain that finding.
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH UTAH SAVINGS
AND TRUST COMPANY (Cont'd.)
2. The Evidence Was Wholly Insufficient To Establish
The Bank's Deed As A Mortgage.
We haYe seen that to make a. deed a mortgage, both
parties must so intend and that there was no evidence at
all that the intention of the grantors was otherwise than
the warranty deed to Utah Savings (Exhibit D) expressed.
But the evidence was wholly insufficient besides.
The deed said it was a conveyance absolute. And a deed
fair upon its face is presumed to be exactly that-a deed
absolute,
'' ... and a party alleging that a deed, absolute
and unconditional in form, was in effect a mortgage, must meet and overcome the presumption
which the law raises from the face of the papers,
namely, that the instrument is in legal effect just
what is purports to be." 59 C. J. S. Mortgages
§ 48.
Evidence to prove a deed a mortgage is to be received with caution. 36 Am. Jur., Mortgages §134.
More than a mere preponderance is required. Variously put, the evidence must be:
'' . . . clear, certain, plain, convincing, satisfactory, unequivocal, unambigious and conclusive.'' Id. § 134.
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This court has said it must at least be "clear, unequivocal and satisfactory." Garay vs. Roberts 82 Utah
445, 25 p. 2d 940. 1
The general rule is that the evidence must not leave
the nature of the transaction in reasonable doubt. 36 Am.
Jur., Mortgages §135. The reason is easy.
''The reason for the exaction of this high
degree of proof is not far to seek. If a less rigorous rule obtained, no man would be safe in taking
a deed of property. When it had doubled or
trebled in value it would only be necessary for the
grantor to bring witnesses to testify to any agreement that the deed was intended as a mortgage,
to enable him, on payment of the purchase price
and interest, to redeem." 36 Am. Jur., Mortgages,
§ 134.
And the presumption that a deed is a deed, not a
mortgage, grows and grows by lapse of time. 59 C. J. S.
Mortgages, § 48.

Tested by the foregoing principles and rules, the
evidence was wholly insufficient to make this deed a mortgage. There was not only a total failure of proof as to
the grantors' intention. The evidence was all a failure.
First. There was no evidence offered or suggested
about any deed being a security except a meagre two-line
memo penned on the bank's two white cards relating to
the two renewals of the original loan. The first card
1

lt now says "clear, definite, unequivocal and conclusive." Thornley
Land & Livestock Co. vs. Gailey 105 Utah 519, 143 P. 2d 283.
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relating to the original loan was a blue one. (These
three cards make up defendants' Exhibit 8.) It was
not claimed the original loan was secured at all.
That was five months before this deed (Exhibit D) was
ever made. But the two renewal cards (the white ones)
bear the following iThich is all the evidence, and the only
evidence, at all about security:
''Security

R. E. TVarranty Deed
''Description of Property

Part of Sec. 29 Tp. 1 No
Range 1 E, S. L. Mer"
(Italics indicate handwriting.)
Second. This meagre reference did not specify th!is

particular warranty deed at all. There was no specific
reference to it. True counsel will say (1) the deed (Exhibit D) and the first renewal card bore the same dateJanuary 12, 1914, (2) both referred to the same amount
of consideration-$1,400.00, (3) the reference to the
property on the card is only ''part'' of Section 29, and the
deed (Exhibit D) covers only part of Section 29, too.
(But bear in mind the deed is specific, i.e., it describes the
part covered, the card does not.) This, and that no other
deed to any land in Section 29 from Lucie R. Thomas and
husband to Utah Savings has ever been recorded (Tr.
101) proves, respondents say, that this is the deed which
was meant for security.
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Not so. Lucie owned other property in Section 29.
She owned the 32 ''yellow'' lots so called in the Southwest corner of the West tract. (See map Exhibit A). They
were claimed for her by respondents at the trial (Tr. 19)
and the court held they passed to her devisees on her
death. 1
Now, her yellow lots, all 32 of them, were ''part'' of
Section 29. They and Northcrest's 33 "white" lots were
in Capitol Heights second filing which fit into a 30 x 20
rod corner in the Southwest corner of the West 40 acre
tract. The deed to Utah Savings did not include that
20 x 30 rods. It specifically excepted it. (Exhibit D.)
So it left Lucie her 32 lots in Section 29. The deed
described a tract which excepted the 20 x 30 rod corner
like this:
Lucie deeded to Utah Savings
this
and
this
-.
Section 29
-.
(80R)

(80R)

30R

But not
this_.
Her 32 yellow lots were within the shaded area
not covered by her deed.
1

The decree awarded both 40 acre tracts (less Northcrest's 33
stipulated "white" lots) % to John and Gertrude and % to Northcrest as Hugh, Jr.'s grantee. The award had the effect of holding
mother Lucie died owning the 32 yellow lots. (See map Exhibit A.)
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The result is that Lucie owned more than just one
"part" of Section 29. She owned (1) the "part" she
deeded to the bank by Exhibit D and also (2) the "part"
she kept. The part contained in the warranty deed referred to on the loan card without identifying the deed
itself could well haYe been the yellow lots. A warranty
deed to them (or part or only some) would satisfy the
reference to ''part'' of Section 29 scribbled on the cards.
And that deed might well have never been recorded but
simply returned when the loan was paid. That hypothesis is equally as compelling as the conclusion that the
warranty deed and ''part'' were Exhibit B and the
''part'' described therein.
Remember, respondents are the ones who are trying
to prove the mortgage. The deed itself says it is a conveyance absolute. Respondents have the burden here,
not N orthcrest. They had to prove this deed was a mortgage; this very deed Exhibit D, itself. N orthcrest didn't
have to prove anything. And respondents had to prove
the mortgage by evidence which was clear, unequivocal
and satisfactory. Coray vs. Roberts, Supra. "Loose and
random statements or facts and circumstances of doubtful import'' will not suffice. 36 Am. J ur ., Mortgages §134.
Lucie never made claim that the deed was a mortgage. It was made in 1914. She died in 1948. She had
34 years to make that claim and never did. Had she intended a mortgage, she could have given one. And had
this deed actually been the deed intended as a mortgage,
she would have demanded a re-conveyance when she paid
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the loan. And, likewise, presumably, the bank would have
re-conveyed. Remember, the rule of law says a deed
which looks and speaks like a deed is presumed to be a
deed, and'' this presumption is strengthened by lapse
of time ... and the clearness and weight of evidence (to upset it must be correspondingly increased)". (Parentheses supplied.) 59 C. J. S.
Mortgages § 48.
Why should Lucie deed property to the bank outN orthcrest cannot be required to furnish a reason.
The burden is not on it. Respondents must bear the burden of proof. Like McGee, N orthcrest had nothing to do
with the transaction and knows nothing, of course, about
it. Nor need the court supply an answer, either. For it
to hold some other unidentified deed was given as a mortgage does not call for explanation why this identified
deed was given. Perhaps another debt to the bank was
thereby paid. Who knows~
right~

But respondents have failed in their burden of proof.
The mind is far from clear, the evidence far from unequivocal and satisfactory, that this deed and its contents were the actual deed and the actual ''part'' in Section 29 referred to in the memorandum on the loan card.
The evidence was insufficient and the court erred in
holding this deed was but a mortgage.
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH UTAH SAVINGS
AND TRUST COMPANY (Cont'd.)
3. The Evidence By Utah Savings And Trust Company
Attempting To Prove The Deed A Mortgage Was Incompetent After It Had Conveyed To Northcrest.

"A grantor should not have it in his power
to deprive his grantee of the property conveyed
by making statements after the grant.'' 20 Am.
J ur ., Evidence § 606.
Sometimes statements of former owners are received
in evidence as against the title of a grantee. The theory
is (1) they are admissions against interest, and, (2)
the grantee being successor in interest is charged with
the admissions of the former owner. 20 Am. Jur., Evidence §604.
But, a statement of a grantor to be admissible must
have been made while he was owner, not afterward.
"One of the conditions under which the statement of a former owner against his interest is
admitted in evidence against his successor as an
admission binding on the latter is that the statement be one made while he had a proprietary
interest in the property. Accordingly, the declaration of a former owner made before he acquired
title or after his conveyance of the property ordinarily is not admissibue againsh his grantee.'' 20
Am. Jur., Evidence§ 605.

''Statements after alienation. Declarations
of a grantor, made after he has parted with his
title, are not admissible against his grantee or
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other persons claiming under the grant. . . . '' 31
C. J. S. Evidence§ 325.
The rule has been recognized for over fifty years in
Utah. Snow vs. Rich, 22 Utah 123, 61 P. 337.
Utah Savings and Trust Company conveyed to
Northcrest December 16, 1947. (Exhibit E). That was
more than three years before the trial in February 1951.
( Tr. 11). Yet, the bank was allowed to declare at the
trial by its records and its officer McGee that it once held
a warranty deed to part of Section 29 as security for a
loan (an equitable mortgage) to Lucie R. Thomas and
husband.
Now, as explained in earlier parts of this brief, the
security deed mentioned was not shown to be the deed
in evidence here (Exhibit D) at all; nor was the "part"
of Section 29 mentioned by the bank's records shown
to be the ''part'' contained in the specific deed, Exhibit
D. For these reasons alone, the deed in suit (Exhibit D)
was not established as a mortage. No ''clear, unequivocal, satisfactory, definite and conclusive" evidence
thereof-in fact no evidence at all about that deed being
a mortgage-was given. Coray vs. Roberts, supra, Thornley Land d!; Livestock Co. vs. Gailey, supra.
But, regardless of the utter insufficiency thereof, the
bank's testimony which was aimed at trying to show this
deed to be a mortgage was incompetent since it constituted statements by a grantor disparaging its former
ownership after it had parted with title and conveyed
to N orthcrest.
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N orthcrest 's objection was elear.

McGee testified
for respondents that the loan card (Exhibit 8) showed a
warranty deed had been held for security. He said (Tr.
64, this Brief l:J) :
"Apparently, in our security column on this
liability card, it has 'R. E. Warranty Deed-Part
of Sec. 29 Tp. 1, No. Range 1 E, S. L. Mer' ''.
Northcrest thereupon objected:
".J1:R. THOMAS: At that point. I didn't
anticipate that coming as quick as it did. I move
to strike out the witness' answer in regard to the
alleged security and description, and object to the
same upon the ground it is incompetent, immaterial, irrelevant, and as constituting an attempt
on the part of the Utah Savings & Trust Company,
the grantor of this plaintiff, to furnish statements
and declarations against its ownership, and
against the title of the plaintiff after the Utah
Savings & Trust Company has parted with title."
The court seemed inclined to agree, then wavered
and overruled the objection (Tr. 65):
"THE COURT: They did so by Quit Claim
Deed. That is in evidence.
''MR. THOMAS: That is right. Exhibit E.''
(Argument by counsel.)
''THE COURT : I am going to let you proceed Objection overruled.''
After further explanation thereof by the bank officer,
the loan cards (indicating some warranty deed had been
held for security) were offered. McGee at that point
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denied knowledge of the transactions himself, saying he
had not worked for the bank that early. N orthcrest then
objected but the cards were let in. ( Tr. 54, this Brief 15).
"MR. THOMAS: I object to them, your
Honor, as incompetent, immaterial, irrelevant
and hearsay, and upon the grounds that the proper foundation has not been laid, and also upon
the grounds they are an attempt on the part of
the Utah Savings & Trust Company, the grantor
of this plaintiff, to give evidence in disparagement of its own title to the property in question.
That is, I assume they are offered for the purpose
of showing the security transaction of the real
estate involved here."
"MR. CHRISTENSEN: That is right."
"MR. THOMAS: I object to them on those
grounds.''
"THE COURT: Objection overruled, and the
exhibit will be received."
Respondents will say that N orthcrest gave nothing
for the deed (Exhibit E) from Utah Savings to it. But it
did. A good consideration passed.
Young Hugh received $3,200.00 from N orthcrest.
( Tr. 78). When N orthcrest dealt with him its counsel
found the deed from Lucie to Utah Savings and Trust
C~mpany recorded and outstanding. (Tr. 76). Northcrest then told Hugh they expected a deed from Utah
Savings (Tr. 78), that whatever Northcrest paid Hugh
was to include such a deed; N orthcrest would insist on it.
That was part of the purchase price. (Tr. 79). This was
sufficient consideration to support the deed.
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"From or to Whom the Consideration Must Move.
-Consideration may move to the promiser or to
a third person. It may be added that it is not
essential that the consideration be given by the
promisee; a consideration mo uing from a third
person is sufficient." 12 Am. Jur. Contracts~ 76.

And anyway the rule rejecting statements by a
grantor after he has conveyed was never related to the
question of consideration.
"It has been repeatedly held, without specific
discussion of the effect of a lack of consideration,
that the declarations of a donor in disparagement
of title, made subsequent to the full execution of
a deed of gift, being mere hearsay, and neither a
part of the res gestae nor declarations against a
present interest, are not admissible to defeat the
completed gift, either against the donee or his
privies, or in favor of the grantor or others
claiming under him, it being held incompetent for
him to affect, or to make evidence in reference to
the title conferred . . . In fact, the rule has been
laid down that the law does not recognize that
derogatory declarations of a grantor, made after
parting with title, are more likely to be true where
the transfer was without consideration than where
the conveyance was based upon a valuable consideration.'' 2 Jones, Commentaries on Evidence
(2d Ed. ~ 913}.

But, if no consideration had been present and if
Utah Savings simply made a gift to Northcrest of the
deed, the result would be no different. ''Statements by
grantors of gift deeds may not be received after they
have parted with their title." 1 A. L. R. 1240. The rule
applies to gifts of personality, too. Id. 1241.
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The testimony of Utah Savings and Trust Company
by its officer aimed at proving they had title only as a
mortgage was incompetent and erroneously received. It
was the only evidence upon the subject. The findings and
judgment based wholly upon that incompetent evidence
cannot survive but must be set aside.
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH
HUGH L. THOMAS, JR.
1. The Notary's Testimony Denying Lucie Acknowledged

The Deed To Hugh, Jr. Was Incompetent.

'' ... There is a diversity of opinion as to the
admissibility of testimony of the certifying officer
to impeach his own certificate, and as to its weight
if admitted. A majority, perhaps, take the view
that it is against public policy to allow a public
officer by oral testimony to undermine his official
certificate." 1 Am. Jur. Acknowledgments § 154.
The office of notary public is of ancient origin, both
in Roman law and common law as well. It has been known
to practically all of the Christian nations for centuries.
39 Am. Jur., Notaries §3. 66 C. J. S. Notaries §1.
A notary public, as the name implies, is a public
officer. Id. In Utah notaries are appointed by the Governor for 4 year terms, must give bond of $500.00 and take
the "Constitutional Oath". Title 63, U. C. A. Their
powers are to administer oaths, acknowledge instruments
of writing, take affidavits and depositions, etc. §63-1-5.
§78-2-1, U. C. A. A notary must annex his certificate of
acknowledgement to instruments of conveyance. §78-2-4.
And such conveyances may then be recorded in the
County Recorder's office. §78-3-1.
Notaries may acknowledge a private writing and
a notary's certificate thereon is prima facie proof of
its execution. §104-48-12. §104-25-7, Supp. And every
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instrument affecting real estate so acknowledged (or the
record or a certified copy) is received in evidence without
further proof. §104-48-14. §104-25-13, Supp.
Here N orthcrest proved another separate chain of
title. This was (1) a deed from LucieR. Thomas to Hugh
L. Thomas, Jr. in 1947 (Exhibit B), and, (2) a deed from
him to Northcrest in 1948 (Exhibit C). This chain as
limited by the deed from Lucie to Hugh (Exhibit B)
covered both 40 acre tracts less a strip containing Northcrest's 33 "white" lots and Lucie's 32 "yellow" lots (so
called) in the Southwest of the West 40 acre tract where
the "20 x 30 rod" strip is located (but slightly longer).
See map (Exhibit A).
Marguerite Clayton is a notary public. She knew
Lucie R. Thomas for 15 years. (Tr. 57). She was the
notary who certified to the acknowledgment on the deed
from Lucie to son, Hugh, September 16, 1947. (Exhibit
B). Therein, as a public offiicer who had sworn to the
''Constitutional Oath ... to discharge the duties of my
office with fidelity" (Constitution of Utah, Article IV,
§10), she certified as a notary public in her solemn, official capacity as such that Lucie acknowledged the deed
(Exhibit B) before her. And she signed the certificate
of that acknowledgement in her official capacity as a
public officer and also affixed here official seal thereto.
That deed was thus entitled to be recorded, which it was,
and also to be received (or a certified copy thereof) in
evidence at this trial (as a copy was) without further
proof (Exhibit B). But respondents disputed Lucie's

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY

33

signature to the deed and denied that she had actually
acknowledged it. So they brought the notary to testify.
err. 57). Over ~ortheret;t 's repeated objections, respondents' counsel and the court both took a hand at questioning her and finally wrung from her a simple negative
"no'' as to whether Lucie actually did appear and acknowledge the deed. ( Tr. 60). The court, being curious
as to why, then, she had certified to Lucie's acknowledgment, she explained simply "it looked like her signature
to me. I had seen it." (Tr. 61).
This notary lied. Either she lied (1) when she
solemnly certified on the deed that Lucie appeared before
her and acknowledged the instrument, or, (2) when she
swore on the witness stand that Lucie did not. She lied
at one time or the other. She admittedly violated one
oath or the other, her Constitutional Oath to "discharge
the duties of her office (as notary) with fidelity" or her
oath as a sworn witness to tell ''the whole truth and
nothing but the truth." §104-49-27. §104-24-17, Supp.
So the case for respondents on the question of
acknowledgment rests entirely on the infirm testimony
of the witness who, by her own lips, proved she is not to be
believed. Evidence like that shows why "a majority
perhaps, take the view that it is against public policy to
allow a public officer by oral testimony to undermine his
official certificate." 1 Am. Jur. Acknowledgments §154
supra.
The authorities are not numerous. But those prohibiting the testimony reason wisely (1) that allowing
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such evidence is against public policy, (2) that, being
made at the time of the acknowledgement and being
the solemn declaration of an officer in his public and official capacity under his hand and seal, the certificate is
more likely to be true than the memory and testimony
of the witness years afterward, and, (3) persons who have
dealt and paid in reliance on the truth of the certificate
should be protected against the contradictory statements
of the notary made afterward. 1 Am. Jur. Acknowledgments. §154.
Idaho will not allow a notary to testify and renounce
his certificate. First National Ba;nk vs. Glenn 10 Idaho
224, 77 p. 623.
''No notary should be allowed to come into
court ... and give testimony impeaching his certiflca te to the mortgage which is being foreclosed
... The certificate is made at the time of acknowledgment and is the solemn declaration of the
official in his official capacity as to the truth
and accuracy of the statements it contains, and
it is much more likely to be true and correct
than the memory of the person in years afterward . . . after persons have relied upon the
faith and correctness of his official statement,
and invested their money, and rights have
grown up thereunder, the person who acknowledged as such official and made such certificate
should not be heard in a court of justice disputing
its correctness.'' Id.
A justice of the peace who takes an acknowledgment
has not been allowed afterward to impeach his official
certificate. Woodridge vs. Woodridge (W.Va.) 72 S. E.
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65-l. And eYen in states where notaries are allowed to
testify and renounce their certificates, it is agreed that
their testimony is of little value.
••Generally, testimony of the officer tending
to impeach his certificate is given little weight."
1 C. J. S. ~\cknowledgments § 142.
In weighing the testimony of the notary against his
own certificate, the latter as the New York court points
out, should be entitled to as much, if not more, weight than
the officer's testimony, especially after a lapse of 2 years
(as here). Sparker vs. Sparker 274 N. Y. S. 454. 152
Misc. 8671 •
The certificate should be g~ven great weight and
cannot be lightly overcome. In fact, it has been said
"that it makes a prima facie case, and that it is equivalent
to the sworn testimony of one apparently disinterested,
credible witness." 1 C. J. S. Acknowledgments §141.

It will not be overthrown by a mere preponderance
of the evidence. There must be a decided preponderance.
1 Am. Jur. Acknowledgments §155.
Respondents produced a handwriting expert, J.
Percy Goddard, and also two other witnesses, Fisher
1

"The certificate is made evidence under the statute. It should,
therefore, be entitled to as much, if not more, weight than the
evidence of the officer who executed it, when offered to impeach
its validity. If courts accept the uncorroborated testimony of
officers taking acknowledgements to deeds to impeach their
certificates, titles to real property would indeed be insecure.
Against the solemn certificate executed by the notary herein, his
recollection, at this late date (two years after taking acknowledgment) should not prevail." Sparker vs. Sparker.
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Harris and Vernon W. :Mackay, who said the signature
to the deed (Exhibit B) was not in Lucie's hand; was
not written by her. (Tr. 32, 46, 41, 42). Northcrest admits
that Lucie herself did not write the signature on the deed.
But a grantor may adopt his signature as written by
another by acknowledging the deed before a notary.
Respondents' expert and other witnesses testified only
that t~e signature was not Lucie's. But that was not
enough. That goes only to who wrote the signature, not
to whether Lucie afterward acknowledged the deed as her
own and thereby adopted the signature thereon. This
will be discussed presently in the next part of this brief,
page 37.
So, on the question of acknowledgment, the notary's
certificate must be weighed solely against the uncredita ble testimony of the officer who afterward renounced it.
As seen, it cannot be overcome by her simple renunciation.
Sparker vs. Sparker, supra.
It was error by the weight of authority for the
notary to be permitted to impeach her certificate of
acknowledgment to the deed (Exhibit B). Furthermore,
her testimony proved she was not to be believed and so
her certificate outweighs her testimony to the contrary.
The ackn~wledgment to the deed survives and the deed
from Lucie to son, Hugh, must stand.
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH
HUGH L. THOMAS, JR. (Cont'd).
2. Since The Notary's Evidence That Lucie Did Not Acknowledge The Deed To Hugh, Jr. Was Incompetent
And Insufficient, The Acknowledgement Stands. The
Deed (Exhibit B) Survives.

vVe haYe just seen that the majority rule forbids a
notary to testify and impeach or renounce his certificate
of acknowledgment on a deed, and even in States where
he may do so, that such testimony is given "little
weight", the certificate being entitled to as much, if not
more, weight than the notary's testimony, especially after
a lapse of time (2 years) as here. Sparker vs. Sparker
(N. Y.) supra.
By the weight of authority, therefore, the trial court
erred in receiving the incompetent testimony of the
notary denying Lucie acknowledged the deed (Exhibit
B) to her son, Hugh. Moreover, that evidence was insufficient, too.
N orthcrest admits Lucie personally did not sign the
deed, that she did not write the signature herself. But she
could have adopted the signature as written by someone
else by acknowledging the deed before a notary.
"The fact that the name of the grantor was
signed by another person is of no importance if
the instrument was acknowledged in due form.''
1 Am. Jur. Acknowledgments§ 23.
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Remember, a notary does not certify that the grantor
signed before him, but only that he acknowledged the
signature as his.
"The officer does not certify that the signature was affixed by the grantor. By appearing and
declaring that the signature is his, the grantor
recognizes and adopts it as his own.'' Id.
The rule applies even where forgery is asserted.
"The rule has been applied where it was
claimed that the name was a forgery or was
written without request.
''A grantor can adopt his name written on
an instrument by another, where he makes his
mark as his signature, by making a formal
acknowledgment of the instrument before an
officer, although he is able to write his own name.
''As against any person who without knowledge has acted thereon, the grantor is estopped
to deny that the signature is his." 1 Am. Jur.
Acknowledgments § 23.
Where a woman claimed her name was forged, the
court held her acknowledgment of the deed rendered her
claim of forgery unimportant. Look:

''It is of no importance who put her name
to the deed, so long as it is of record that she
acknowledged the signature.'' Kerr vs. Russell
69 Ill. 666, 18 Am. Rep. 634.
But no claim of forgery was made in our case. All
respondents proved was that the signature was not in
Lucie's hand. (Whose hand? Respondents did not say
and did not prove. Their findings also declined to name
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the signer.) Proof only that a signature is not in the
handwriting of a named signer does not establish forgery. Even the latter's testimony (1) that he did not
sign, and, (2) that the signature is not his handwriting,
is not enough. There must be proof also that the signature was not authorized. State vs. Jones 81 Utah 503, 20
P. 2d 614.
"It is not forgery for one to write another's
name with authority." Id.
"To establish falsity it must be made to appear not only that the person whose name is
signed to the instrument did not sign it but also
that his name was signed without authority." Id.
The rule is:
''The law ... thinks no evil. Perhaps there
is no presumption more highly favored in the law
than the presumption of innocence.'' 1 Jones Commentaries on Evidence, P. 82.
And,
''The presumption of innocence is of constant
application in civil actions . . . (and) where the
proper issue is involved, the legal presumption
that men are not guilty of fraud or dishonesty
and, more strongly, that they do not commit
criminal offenses, comes into play." Id. P. 88-9.
As to deeds:
''One may adopt a deed which has been executed in his name by another. He does this by
acknowledging and delivering such deed as his
own, and he will not afterwards be allowed to
deny that the signature is his. This rule obtains
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in cases where the person's signature is affixed
without his knowledge.'' 7 Thompson, Real Property, § 3881.
It is clear, therefore, that proof simply that a signature is not in the hand of the named signer is wholly insufficient. That will not even prove forgery. For the signing may have been authorized.

But, although not authorized, the signature may be
adopted afterward by the true named signer, and, as
shown, the grantor thereby makes the signature his own.
Acknowledging the signature to a notary adopts it, as the
authorities unanimously show. On this, there can be no
dissent. The postulate is self evident.
This deed (Exhibit B) was not signed by Lucie herself. But, even so, she had a right to acknowledge and
thereby adopt it and the signature for her own. Marguerite Clayton, notary public, certified that she did. By
that certificate the deed was proved to be the deed of
Lucie R. Thomas ''as a conveyance of real property.''
§104-48-12. By that certificate the deed was likewise
"read in evidence ... without further proof." §104-48-14.
§104-25-13. Supp.
But the notary now stultifies herself. She would
now assert the deed was not in fact acknowledged. That
evidence, contrary to the notary's official certificate on
the deed, will not be accepted by the weight of authority.
1 Am. J ur. Acknowledgements §154. But, even where
received, it is entitled to but little weight. 1 C. J. S.
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Acknowledgements §142. The certificate is entitled to
•'as much, if not more, weight than the officer's testimony,'' Sparker rs. Sparket·, supra; it is even to be counted, as one authority suggests, equivalent to the sworn
testimony of one apparently disinterested, credible witness. 1 l~. J. S. Acknowledgments §142.
The trial court erred. Marguerite Clayton should
not have been allowed to testify. But when she did, she
proved she was not worthy of belief for she certified once
the deed was acknowledged, later swore that it was not.
Her evidence was wholly contradictory and unworthy of
belief. Her certificate must stand. Lucie must be taken
to have acknowledged the deed (Exhibit B) and adopted
the signature.
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH HEMPSTEADS
1. N orthcrest Established Title To The West Forty Acre

Tract Through H. H. Hempstead, Regardless Of Its
Alternate Titles To Both Tracts.

As we have shown, the evidence established title in
Northcrest alternately (1) through Utah Savings & Trust
Company, and, (2) through Hugh L. Thomas, Jr. Those
alternate titles related to both 40 acre tracts (less the
20 x 30 rod corner in the West Tract).
As stated at the outset (P. 3) when the trial came on
N orthcrest, by then, was able to trace title back to Lucie
R. Thomas through those 2 chains. But, it was also able
to trace back to her through a third chain as well: (3)
Through H. H. Hempstead on the West 40 acre tract
alone. It had the right to prove "whatever title it had."
State vs. Rolio 71 Utah 91, 262 P. 987. So, proof of Northcrest's title to the whole aside, it proved alternately, as
will now be shown, title nevertheless to the West 40 acre
tract (less the 20 x 30 rods) through Hempstead. This
title came from Lucie-to-Hempstead-to-Northcrest. We
will speak of its as the West 40 acres. It is thus:
80R

Section 29

Lucie deeded
this to
H. H. Hempstead
(West 40 A.)

80R

.................................................................!

Not This
(E. 40 A.)

30R

Not~~
C\l

this

"'------t----------·-································-:
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N orthcrest set up the Hempstead chain by supplemental complaint after the action was commenced. It
alleged (1) that it had owned the West 40 acre tract (less
20 x 30 rods) when the suit commenced, but, if not, (2)
that it had since acquired that tract. ( Tr. 8).
The Hempstead title started with Lucie R. Thomas
and ran from her to Hempstead to N orthcrest. Northcrest
proved the same by the following:
1. A warranty deed from Lucie R. Thomas
to H. H. Hempstead December 16, 1908. (Exhibit F).
2. A deed from Lucy S. Hempstead (Hempsteads widow, sole heir and devisee) to N orthcrest
November 29, 1950. (Exhibit G.)
3. A Salt Lake County District Court Decree
by Northcrest against Hempstead's administrator
(and also his widow) quieting N orthcrest 's title
January 26, 1951. (Exhibit H.)
So, it is plain that regardless of N orthcrest 's two
other alternate chains to the whole, it proved title to the
West half (West 40 acres) at least, through the Hempsteads. The documents were not disputed. Respondents
objected only that they were ''not within the issues of this
case". (Tr. 24). The court found, as it was bound to do
on the record, (1) that the deed from Lucie R. Thomas to
Hempstead was made and recorded, Tr. 108, (2) that
Hempstead's widow conveyed to Northcrest, and, (3)
that Northcrest quieted title against Hempstead's administrator and widow. (Tr. 109). But the court stopped
there. It totally ignored the effect of those findings, it
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found nothing as a fact and concluded nothing as a matter
of law to avoid their result. The court explained futilely
in an earlier finding that N orthcrest and Hugh, Jr. had
thought ("agreed" was the word used) that Lucie's deed
to Hempstead was ''no more than a cloud'' which ought
to be removed. ( Tr. 108).
But Northcrest's and Hugh's "agreed" thoughts
about his mother's deed to Hempstead could not alter
its legal effect one whit. That is too plain for argument.
That is was a deed from Lucie to Hempstead is not denied
and was specifically found as stated by the court in findings prepared and submitted by respondents. And that
this deed conveyed title to Hempstead is undeniable, too.
The deed to N orthcrest from Hempstead's widow, sole
heir and devisee is not disputed either. It was found to
have been made and given, as was also Northcrest's quiet
title decree against Hempstead's administrator and his
widow. (Tr. 108, 109).
So, N orthcrest proved and the court found upon the
Hempstead title exactly as we stated: (1) a deed from
Lucie R. Thomas to Hempstead, and, (2) a deed from
Hempstead's widow, sole heir and devisee to N orthcrest.
Those two deeds proved N orthcrest 's title without more.
But the proof and findings added more, i.e., (3) a decree
by Northcrest against Hempstead's administrator (and
his widow) besides. The effect of these documents is not
to be denied. They effectively vested title in N orthcrest.
It will not do for the trial court to explain, as it did,
that N orthcrest and Hugh thought the Hempstead deed
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was no more than a cloud. That is only an exposition of
a misplaced thought. It will not avoid the legal effect
of the deed. Neither will the fact that Northcrest was
so fortunate as to be wrong about it at the time! So, when
Xorthcrest acquired Hempstead's title-as it had a right
to do-it acquired the property.
The court erred. The West 40 acre tract (less 20 x
30 rods) was N orthcrest 's and should have been so adjudged irrespective of N orthcrest 's title as otherwise
alternately claimed and established to both 40 acre tracts.
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CONCLUSION

Lucie R. Thomas was the former owner of the property in suit. But Northcrest traced title back to her by
3 alternate chains: To the two 40 acre tracts, (1) through
Utah Savings and Trust Company, and, (2) through her
son, Hugh, and, ( 3) to the West 40 acre tract through
H. H. Hempstead as well.
The 33 "white" lots (within the 20 x 30 rods) were
stipulated and adjudged to be Northcrest's. But the rest
of the two 40 acre tracts (including the other 32 "yellow"
lots) were adjudged never to have been conveyed by
Lucie in her lifetime and to have passed by will upon her
death to her three children, John, New York; Gertrude,
Virgin Islands; and Hugh, Jr., Salt Lake City. Since
Hugh afterward conveyed to Northcrest, only the Y3
share said to have reached him on his mother's death
was adjudged to have passed to Northcrest, no more. But
upon this record, that was error. The whole of the property should have been adjudged as N orthcrest 's except
the 32 "yellow" lots (within the 20 x 30 rods) which
were properly awarded Y3 to Northcrest and ~ to John
and Gertrude.
Appellant submits:
1. The evidence failed to establish the warranty
deed from Lucie R. Thomas to Utah Savings and Trust
Company(Exhibit D) was )nly a mortgage. Intention
rules; intention of both parties, grantor and grantee.
McGee, the bank's officer, was the only witness on this
point. The grantee's intention aside, there was no evi-
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dence at all upon the intention of the grantors; none
whatever. .\nd there was no proof that the warranty
deed referred to in the bank's old records was in fact
the deed here. (Exhibit D).
~The evidence was insufficient altogether to establish the deed (Exhibit D) to be a mortgage. A deed
absolute is presumed to be just that; a conveyance, not a
mortgage. .-\ party asserting a deed is a mortgage has
the burden of proof. More than a preponderance is required. The evidence must be "clear, definite, unequivocal and conclusive.'' Thornley L. L. Co. vs. Gailey
105 Utah 519, 143 P. 2d 283. 1 It must not leave the
transaction in reasonable doubt. 36 Am. Jur. Mortgages §135. But the evidence offered here was simply
a reference on the bank's loan card (Exhibit 8)
to a warranty deed to part of Section 29, no
more. What deed and what part was not specified. Lucie,
remember, also owned the 32 "yellow" lots in Section 29.
So she owned more than one part in that Section. A deed
to the 32 lots-or only some of them-would have satisfied the reference to "part" of Section 29 Respondents
had the burden. That burden required them to prove this
very deed itself (Exhibit D) not just some deed was intended as a mortgage. But they failed. Lucie herself had
34 years to claim the deed was but a mortgage and to
demand a re-conveyance. But she did not. The presumption that a deed absolute is a conveyance is strengthened
by lapse of time. 59 C. J. S. Mortgages §48. It grows
1

To same effect see Pender vs. Anderson (Utah) just decided and
contained in the Pacific Reporter advance sheet October 5, 1951,
235 p 2d 360.
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and grows. It had surely outgrown respondents' feeble
proof long ago.
3. The evidence by Utah Savings and Trust Company through its officer, McGee, aimed at proving the
deed, (Exhibit D) to be a mortgage, was incompetent.
Statements of a grantor made, as here, after parting
with title are not admissible to disparage the grantor's
former ownership. The rule appli~s without regard to
consideration, even in cases of gift. N orthcrest paid a
consideration to Hugh, Jr. for a deed from Utah Savings.
Consideration may always move between third parties.
But if it couldn't, and if Utah Savings had made an outright gift of its deed (Exhibit E) to N orthcrest, the result is no different. The rule prevents grantors from
belittling their former titles after they have conveyed,
consideration or no consideration.
4. The notary's testimony denying Lucie acknowledged the deed to her son Hugh (Exhibit B) was by the
weight of authority incompetent. 1 Am. Jur. Acknowledgments ~154. But, if this court is to uphold the trial
court in the opposite view, the testimony was insufficient.
In States where the notary is allowed to renounce his
certificate his testimony is entitled to but "little weight".
1 C. J. S. Acknowledgements ~142. On the other hand, the
certificate should be given great weight and cannot be
lightly overcome. Id. ~141. A mere preponderance will
not suffice. 1 Am. Jur. Acknowledgements ~155. This
notary once certified Lucie acknowledged the deed; later
swore she did not. She is not to be believed. Her certifi-
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rate is entitled to as much, if not more, weight than her
simple testimony to the contrary, especially after a lapse
of ~ years' time, as here. Sparker cs. Sparker, supra.
5. Since the notary's evidence \Vas incompetent and
also insufficient, the acknowledgment stands and Lucie's
deed to her son, Hugh, (Exhibit B) survives. Although
the signature was not signed by her personally, the
acknowledgment of the deed adopted, the signature as already written thereon. Proof only that Lucie did not sign
does not destroy the deed. Her acknowledgment certified
on the deed makes the signature her adopted one.
6. Were all else to fail, N orthcrest 's title through
H. H. Hempstead is good. The deed from Lucie to Hempstead, the deed from Hompstead 's widow to N orthcrest,
and Northcrest's quiet title decree against Hempstead's
administrator and his widow, are not denied. They are
proved and are firmly established by the court's findings.
Yet, because the court explained that N orthcrest and
Hugh thought Hempstead's deed was only a cloud, it
denied the legal effect thereof as a conveyance. But
thinking will not make a deed a cloud. Respondents cannot deny N orthcrest 's right to be so fortunate as to have
been wrong in that particular. The deed was a deed, not
a cloud. The cloud, for respondents, has vanished. The
Hempstead title which thus passed to N orthcrest covered
the West 40 acres (less 20 x 30 rods). See Sketch Page 42.
7. The court properly adjudged to Northcrest the
stipulated 33 "white" lots in the 20 x 30 rod strip. It
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also properly adjudged to Northcrest a one-third in
terest in Lucie's 32 "yellow" lots which she had not con
veyed and which passed to Hugh by Lucie's will and wen
to N orthcrest under Hugh's deed to it of all the property
(Exhibit C.) But, it should have adjudged the rest of th~
property to Northcrest, too. But it did not. It gave North
crest only Y3 thereof and gave ¥3 to John an(
Gertrude. This was error. The judgment must hE
reversed with directions to enter judgment for Northcrest to all of the property and quieting its title thereto:
except the undivided two-thirds of the "yellow lots':
which passed to John and Gertrude by Lucie's will; and
for costs.
Respectfully submitted,
THOMAS & ARMSTRONG,
Attorneys for Appellant,
Northcrest, Inc.
October, 1951.
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